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REVISITING THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION
AND RELATED PROBLEMS
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.t
The event of this symposium on the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments is welcome to the Reporter. It signifies that the work is
done and the indenture fulfilled. Only those who have been in-
volved in one of these long term enterprises can appreciate how
much that means. Beyond that, it is deeply gratifying to have a
signal that the project seems successful. During such a venture,
the participants never know for sure that success will be achieved,
for they are bent in a curious mixture of relentless self-criticism
and continual self-congratulation, the latter reflecting partly
genuine mutual esteem and partly a conscious effort to sustain
purpose and morale. I take from what is said here, and what is
not said, that the enterprise came out pretty well. If working con-
ventional law is worth doing, and if a Restatement is a worthwhile
way of working the law, then the verdict is that the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments has been worthwhile.' There are not many
things of which that can be said with real conviction.
On the whole I found the task very rewarding. A Restatement
provides lawyers, judges, and law professors a chance to write the
law, instead of merely talking about writing the law. Lawyers and
law professors are, of course, frustrated judges. So are judges,
because to a serious jurist, the judicial decision conference must
be the ultimate frustration. By contrast, in the Restatement process
nothing much depends on the outcome, except the legal merit of
the product.
Writing a Restatement can occasion the best of all legal semi-
nars. The rules of the forum are academic in the best sense. A
premium is placed on neutrality in outlook, universality in re-
sponsibility, and providing opportunity to think. At the same
time, the participants in the Restatement are lawyers in the best
t John A. Garver Professor of Law, Yale University; Reporter, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS (1980).
Some will say that the American Law Institute would have been better employed at
other things, such as trying to devise a means for implementing Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), or the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4361 (1976). There is reason to doubt, however, that anyone would have employed
the American Law Institute for such purposes.
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sense-smart, tough veterans of all forms of legal intercourse.
Paper Chase2 with everyone a Kingsfield.
A Restatement is also the ultimately demanding challenge in le-
gal craftsmanship. The law requires that cases be decided justly if
possible. It also requires that, if possible, the decisions be recon-
ciled on premises that are general and hence even-handed. Law
requires both good judging and good legislating. A Restatement re-
quires both at the same time, because it seeks to formulate gen-
eral propositions that are compatible with prevailing sentiment as to
how concrete cases ought to come out.
The reviewers say, however, that there were things we left
undone. Professor Clermont points to the problem of interstate
jurisdiction, and Professor Vestal to the problem of res judicata in
criminal cases. The reviewers also say that some things we simply
got wrong. Professor Vestal argues that we took too narrow a
view of the principle of issue preclusion, Professor Martin says we
kept some obsolete terminological baggage, and Professor Moore
says that we kept some obsolete conceptual baggage. Finally, Pro-
fessor Casad points to some discontinuities that will have to be
ironed out in the future.
The reviewers have cited but a sample of instances of de-
ficiency. I could give them many more. A project of this sort is
always an accommodation between what the collective mind be-
lieves ought to be done and what the collective body can actually
accomplish. Moreoever, when the Restatement Second gets into the
courts, more deficiencies will be revealed, because there are limits
to what the collective mind can see at any given time.
What more can a player say about the reviews, if only to
demonstrate that there is no end to discussion of what the law is
or ought to be?
I
INTERSTATE JURISDICTION
The place of trial among the state courts for civil litigation
involving multistate elements is determined by interpretation of
the due process and full faith and credit clauses in a long line of
ambiguous cases of which Pennoyer v. Neff and International Shoe
2j. OSBORN, THE PAPER CHASE (1972).
- 94 U.S. 714 (1877).
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v. Washington4 are the most central. The place of trial among
federal courts is generally determined by a federal statute that
was not well thought out when enacted in 1887 and was not well
reconsidered when amended in 1948.5 Moreover, as to most ac-
tions, federal courts incorporate state law on service of process,
thereby incorporating the ambiguities of the Pennoyer-International
Shoe line of decisions. Professor Clermont complains that the Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments merely refers to the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws on the question of state court jurisdic-
tion and does nothing about federal venue.6 He wonders why we
did not work out a single framework of national venue, and
offers a method of analysis by which we could have moved toward
doing so.7
This is a perfectly cogent criticism and deserves a response.
In framing the project for the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
the American Law Institute decided not to rework the law of in-
terstate place of trial in any fundamental way. The Institute had
already considered the topic extensively in the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws' and in the Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts.9 Both were major projects involv-
ing large intellectual efforts and substantial commitment of very
limited financial resources. Other topics compete for the attention
of the Institute and its intellectual and financial donors, such as
tax law, securities regulation, corporate governance, torts, con-
tracts, and property.
Professor Clermont might argue that the Conflicts and Federal
Jurisdiction projects, considered separately or together, did not en-
gage adequately the problem of multistate litigation. More specifi-
cally, he might say that the Conflicts project considered state court
jurisdiction merely as an incident of the problem of choice of law
and not as a question of fairness and convenience of trial in a
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
6 Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 411 (1981). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7, Comment a (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 4] refers to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 99 24, 56
(1971) on the issue of state court territorial jurisdiction. [Throughout this Article, the cor-
responding section numbers that will appear in the final Restatement Second are given in
brackets after citation to the tentative drafts.]
Clermont, supra note 6, at 450, 462.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 24, 56 (1971).
9 See ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 99 2371-2376 (1969); id. at 375-410.
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federal legal system.'0 By the same token, the Federal Jurisdiction
project considered convenience of trial only in federal courts and
treated the problem of state court territorial jurisdiction as out-
side its scope." This argument has force, but force that carries
forward to an encounter with a further difficulty. If the problem
of multistate venue should be considered comprehensively, as
Professor Clermont urges, it would require either a project about
forum that ignored choice of law-state-to-state and federal-to-
state-or a project that encompassed both forum and choice of
law in both state and federal courts. Trying to deal with forum
choice without considering choice of law is possible but very
unsatisfactory. 2 Trying to deal with forum choice and choice of
law for the American legal system as a whole, state and federal, is
a sizeable task that Professor Clermont may relish, and someday
may be drawn into, but one that I would like to leave for him or
someone else.
At another level, the trouble with trying to deal in one pack-
age with interstate venue and venue of the federal district courts
is that these subjects historically have been the provinces of differ-
ent law-givers. Interstate venue has been the province of the
judiciary-the state supreme courts and the United States Su-
preme Court interacting with each other.'" The dynamic in this
body of law has been litigation, through participation of the ran-
dom litigants who happen to get involved in cases involving these
problems. In contrast, venue of the federal courts has been pri-
marily the province of Congress, where the dynamic is the legisla-
tive process and the participation is by those who have a voice on
matters of federal jurisdiction and the federal courts.'" There
may be some way of coordinating these processes, but I do not
know what it is.
Still another response is that we should not try to integrate
federal venue and interstate venue until both of them separately
are fairly straight in our minds. I agree with Professor Clermont
that federal venue rules are evolving in the direction of
rationality. 5 I agree that interstate venue of state courts can be
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 24, 56 (1971).
n See ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 375-80 (1969).
" See, e.g., Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980).
"3 Cf. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (affirming state supreme
court decision upholding trial court jurisdiction over foreign corporation).
'4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
" See Clermont, supra note 6, at 431.
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moved in the same direction. However, I am not sure that his
analysis will move us further forward, or that his interpretation of
recent Supreme Court cases is a sound one.
Professor Clermont says that, in broad terms, the doctrine re-
garding state court jurisdiction has gone from "power" under
Pennoyer, to "reasonableness" under International Shoe, to a com-
bination of "power" and "reasonableness" in the recent cases of
Shaffer v. Heitner,'6 Kulko v. Superior Court,7 Rush v. Savchuk, 8 and
World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson. 9 I think Professor Cler-
mont is right in suggesting that both "power" and "reasonable-
ness" are elements of state court jurisdiction, but I do not think
the character of the elements, and their relationship to each
other, is as he suggests.
To me the term "power" means the capability of exercising or
threatening physical force to get someone to do something. Surely
this is the definition Justice Holmes had in mind in his famous
statement that the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."
This appears to be the definition that classical jurists and interna-
tional lawyers have in mind when they talk of the power of a
sovereign nation-state. "Power," in this ordinary sense of the
term, is a necessary condition for the exercise of legal authority-
as we are reminded by the fourteen-month internment of the
American hostages in Iran. But questions of power in this sense
are remote to the point of irrelevance in analysis of the problem
of interstate jurisdiction.
It is true that the states may be analogized to independent
sovereignties, an analogy the Supreme Court often makes in talk-
ing about interstate jurisdictional problems. But the analogy is im-
perfect and almost always misleading. The states of the American
union do not have "power" in interstate matters. Connecticut can-
not take New Yorkers as hostages to compel New York to stop
sending it candidates for Senator or otherwise influencing its gov-
ernment; New York cannot impound Connecticut assets deposited
in New York banks to enforce its claims that Connecticut citizens
should pay more taxes for upkeep of the Big Apple. One can
only imagine Larchmont Harbor becoming the subject of an
armed struggle like that over Shatt al-Arab. Occasionally, to be
.6 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
.7 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
18 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
19 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see Clermont, supra note 6, at 414-29.
'o McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
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sure, we encounter an opinion that brings to our minds a vision
of such nonsense. The one I like best is Grace v. McArthur,2 where
a district court judge had to decide whether service of process
effectuated in a commercial airliner while over Arkansas was
effectuated "in" Arkansas. In the course of his opinion the judge
made elaborate reference to the scope of Arkansas's control over
its airspace. In reading that case, I have always had the image of a
company of Arkansas sheriffs deputies deployed in hunting
blinds along the west bank of the Mississippi, waiting with poised
shotguns for the first sight of aircraft from Memphis. But that
picture fades out when I remember that in matters having to do
with distribution of sovereign authority among governments of
the United States, the federal government has a monopoly of
power. That was settled by compact in the Constitution and rati-
fied by force of arms in the Civil War.
So the question involved when states exercise interstate juris-
diction is not one of power but of authority. They have whatever
authority they are bold enough to claim, subject to the limits that
the Supreme Court feels obligated to impose. The attitude of
states in this matter has varied over time and varies from state to
state, sometimes being expansive and sometimes being self-
restrictive. In formulating the authority of the states, there are
two basic questions: what should be the relevant indicia or deter-
minants of authority by which to test whether a state may exercise
judicial jurisdiction in regard to a multistate transaction; and to
what degree or extent must those determinants exist in order for
jurisdiction to be sustained?
The basic determinants have been "presence" of a person or
thing in a state, and connection of a "transaction" to a state. The
required degree is relatively more or relatively less. Under classic
doctrine as expounded in Pennoyer, which analogized the states to
sovereign polities, the critical determinant of judicial authority
was local presence of the person-in personam jurisdiction-or
presence of the thing-in rem jurisdiction. 22 Under International
Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner, the critical determinant has been the
connection of the transaction to the state.23 Presence of a person
or thing and connection of the transaction are both in some sense
related to the idea of power. A state should have authority over
21 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
95 U.S. at 733-34.
2 433 U.S. at 204.
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persons and things that are locally situated, because geographical
proximity is related to effectiveness of legal control. Similarly, a
state should have authority over persons and things that are in-
volved in local transactions because otherwise the state cannot
subject the transaction to effective legal control.
Both pathways of analysis are reasonable-that is, cogent.
Hence, both approaches are manifestations of a concept of
"reasonableness." Furthermore, the concepts of "presence" and
"connection of transaction" merge once we get beyond very sim-
ple transactions. In International Shoe, the Supreme Court held
that the existence of local corporate transactions could be deemed
the equivalent of local corporate presence, on the basis of which
in personam jurisdiction could be exercised.2 4 In Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,2 a precedent that Professor
Clermont seems to think is in jeopardy, 26 the Court held that the
existence of local transactions could be deemed the equivalent of
presence of property, on the basis of which in rem jurisdiction
could be exercised. 27
Thus, all interstate jurisdictional problems have a component
of "power" as the basis upon which authority is allocated among
the states. In allocating such authority the touchstone may be
either "presence" or "transaction," or both. "Presence" and "trans-
action" both require some fictions to work across the board. Also,
both require some common sense to keep them in bounds, that is,
an element of reasonableness.
The limits of the "presence" theory are reached when there is
local physical presence of a person or thing that has no tranac-
tional nexus to the forum, as, for example, where an airline pas-
senger is served with process while the plane is over a state with
which the transaction in suit has no connection whatever. 2  The
Pennoyer doctrine, however, ignored the matter of transactional
nexus. It was the inattention to that nexus which so deeply con-
cerned the late Albert Ehrenzweig and impelled his relentless
attack on "transient" jurisdiction. 29 The same point would arise if
24 326 U.S. at 316-17.
" 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
See Clermont, supra note 6, at 429 n.90.
2 339 U.S. at 313.
28 The transaction in Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), had a
strong connection to Arkansas.
2 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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we considered attachment of the cargo of an airplane where there
was no connection between the transaction in suit and the state
seeking to establish attachment jurisdiction. The decision in Shaf-
fer v. Heitner3 ° seems to provide adequate basis for supposing that
attachment jurisdiction is ordinarily improper without a trans-
actional nexus and that in personam jurisdiction is subject to the
same limitation.' Thus, ordinarily, "presence" is no longer
enough.
The "transaction" approach also has its limits. These limits
are reached when the definition of transaction is unreasonably
attenuated to include even remote connections. For example, it is
foreseeable that a child of mine may wind up penniless in
Tobago, but it is stretching things to say that such an eventuality
should result in my being subject to jurisdiction for a support ac-
tion in Tobago. Yet that is about what the California Supreme
Court held in Kulko.3 2 It is foreseeable that a victim of a Connec-
ticut tort might suffer agony that persists in Tobago, but it is
stretching things to say that such a consequence results in jurisdic-
tion in Tobago for an action against the Connecticut tortfeasor.
Nevertheless, that is about what the Minnesota Supreme Court
held in Rush v. Savchuck.33 And why should a New York auto
dealer be answerable in Oklahoma simply because the car broke
down there, the situation involved in World-Wide Volkswagen? 34
The decisions of the Supreme Court in these cases are
concretions that give meaning to the terms "reasonable" or
"reasonably foreseeable." Concretions such as these are necessary
epistemologically, for they convey a sense of proportion and
dimension in the use of a concept that otherwise has no limits
short of those of imagination. They are necessary as a practical
matter to correct imperialist tendencies in lower echelons of our
federal legal system. There should be nothing surprising or
mysterious in the pronouncement of "arbitrary" corollaries to a
general principle of "reasonableness." 5 Such corollaries are
found, for example, in the statutes of limitation that give specific
meaning to the concept of unreasonable delay, 6 the definite
'o 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
" But see Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (Ist Cir. 1976) (action against
Vermont partnership upholding in personam jurisdiction in New Hampshire over Ver-
mont partner based on in-hand service of partner in New Hampshire).
32 436 U.S. at 89.
311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W. 2d 624 (1976); see 444 U.S. at 324.
14 444 U.S. at 289-91.
See Hazard, A General Theory of Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 283.
'6 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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speed limits that give specific meaning to the concept of un-
reasonable speed, and the use of the concept of "proximate" to
modify "cause" as the basis of tort liability.
I therefore interpret the recent Supreme Court cases dealing
with territorial jurisdiction in a much less complicated way than
does Professor Clermont. 7 The present doctrine seems to me
something like this: the authority of the states to exercise judicial
jurisdiction in litigation having multistate elements depends on
the existence of a reasonable relationship between the state and
the person, thing, or transaction involved in the litigation. Pres-
ence of the defendant is usually such a relationship and so is the
occurrence of a transaction having significant connection with the
state. However, "presence" without any local transactional connec-
tion ordinarily is an insufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction,
and so is exercise of jurisdiction based on a hyperattenuated
transactional connection. Where the state courts cannot discipline
themselves to observe these limits, the Supreme Court will lay
down some mechanical formulae to take care of salient cases and
to provide general guidance. This is a less elegant approach than
Professor Clermont's, but probably yields about the same results.
One other thing about the treatment of state court jurisdic-
tion in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments is that we adopted the
term "territorial jurisdiction" to refer to the Pennoyer-International
Shoe problem. This allowed us to clarify the different conse-
quences that ensue when the question involved concerns territo-
rial jurisdiction as distinct from subject matter jurisdiction."
That usage is also a step in the direction of treating interstate
jurisdiction as a question of venue, as Professor Clermont rightly
urges us to do. 9
II
CRIMINAL RES JUDICATA
The other error of omission laid against the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, in this instance by Professor Vestal, concerns
res judicata in criminal cases.4 1 I think the decision not to under-
s See Clermont, supra note 6, at 414-29.
See notes 86-99 and accompanying text infra.
3' See Clermont, supra note 6, at 462.
Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
464 (1981).
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take this topic was clearly correct for practical and theoretical
reasons. As a practical matter, taking on this subject would have
required restructuring the project. As Reporter, I would have
found myself in a field in which I am not expert, and the oppor-
tunity costs of my becoming such would have been high for me
and for the Institute. Bringing aboard a co-Reporter would have
entailed similar difficulties. The Advisory Committee would also
have had to be reconstructed.
There were, however, more fundamental difficulties. The
contemporary law of criminal res judicata is largely the creation
of a single court, the Supreme Court of the United States.
Moreover, the law on the subject is confused down to its roots.
When both of these conditions exist, it is not easy to make a con-
tribution through a Restatement, even if the law desperately needs
clarification.
It is inappropriate for a Restatement to deal with a subject
that is essentially the product of a single tribunal. Can one imag-
ine a useful Restatement of United States Constitutional Law, or a Re-
statement of New York Contract Law? Most people who have consid-
ered that question reach a negative conclusion, but perhaps
without having worked out exactly why they do. I share the con-
clusion and think that the reason is approximately as follows: A
Restatement is a quasi-official exposition of the law. Although it is
like a treatise in comprehensiveness and endeavors to be disin-
terested, it is the product of an organization constituted not sim-
ply on the basis of scholarly competence but also on the basis of
standing in the legal profession. A Restatement therefore represents
not only academic authority but a combination of academic and
professional authority. The Institute is something like a sister-
jurisdiction to every other common law jurisdiction. It can be re-
garded as an extra-territorial common law jurisdiction- to bor-
row from Holmes, a quasi-sovereign with an articulate voice giv-
ing forth a brooding omnipresence in the sky.4 As such, the
Institute's expositions of "the law" provide a useful resource to
courts encountering problems that have not recently been re-
solved in a specific jurisdiction. It would be fatuous, however, for
the Institute to enter competition with the courts of a specific
jurisdiction to restate its law.
A Restatement of res judicata in criminal cases would in any
case be extremely difficult because of the fundamental confusion
41 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
573
HeinOnline -- 66 Cornell L. Rev. 573 1980-81
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
of doctrine in the field.42 The law on the subject is mostly United
States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the double jeopardy
and due process clauses. 43 These clauses provide only the vaguest
premises for the detail required in the problems of criminal res
judicata. Moreover, the law of res judicata is a mirror image of
the law of procedure. The law of criminal res judicata as nur-
tured by the Supreme Court is essentially a set of federal speci-
fications prescribing the consequences of decisional processes
regulated primarily by state law. State criminal procedure varies
widely with regard to the rules of pleading, joinder, discovery,
nonsuit, and judge-jury functions.4 4 As a consequence, the fed-
eral law of res judicata does not mesh well with the state law of
criminal procedure. The Supreme Court deals with the discrepan-
cies as best it can in the certiorari process, serially and more or
less randomly. In a Restatement, the Institute would have to resolve
these discrepancies at once in a coherent text that is consistent
with the Supreme Court's decisions. As I read a recent hornbook
on the subject, it cannot be done .4
III
ISSUE PRECLUSION
As for the things that were done wrong in the Restatement
Second, there are many more than the reviewers mention. Some of
the sentences, even full paragraphs, and a few blackletter provi-
sions are really very good in my opinion. The rest is only the best
we could do. Even so, we probably made some significant mis-
takes. Our treatment of issue preclusion with respect to an issue
not actually litigated, however, is not one of them.
The position of the Restatement Second is that the principle of
issue preclusion does not preclude a party from subsequently dis-
42 See, United States v. DeFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426, 432 (1980); Westen & Drubel,
Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81; Note, The Double Jeopardy
Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 962 (1980); 65 CORNELL L. REv. 715
(1980).
4' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
As we discovered in doing the civil Restatement Second, these elements of procedure
often portend important differences in resjudicata. A civil Restatement undertaking to ex-
press generally prevailing law is possible because the states have substantially identical civil
procedural systems-systems based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or closely simi-
lar systems, particularly those in California, Illinois, and New York. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introduction at 6-15 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
' See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch. 24 (1980).
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puting, in litigation involving another claim or cause of action, a
material proposition that he admitted or failed to deny in an ear-
lier litigation.46 In this symposium Professor Vestal argues,47 as
he has argued elsewhere,48 that the principle of res judicata
should extend to such a situation.
Some care is required in stating precisely the point of differ-
ence between the two positions. The question is not whether in
various circumstances a party may be estopped from contesting a
proposition previously admitted. Nor is it whether a party may be
conditionally estopped in that he might be required to show good
reason why he should be allowed to controvert a previously
admitted proposition. The question is whether a party should be
categorically denied his day in court on an issue because he had
the "opportunity to litigate" the issue in a prior action. It is
agreed that there may be such an estoppel in many circumstances.
It is also agreed that the estoppel should often have only limited
effect in the subsequent litigation-the truth of the matter should
be treated as presumptive rather than conclusive.
It is also agreed that there is some authority for Professor
Vestal's position, although some cases he cites in this regard can-
not fairly be construed as providing such support. For example,
Professor Vestal attaches much significance to statements in
Schwartz v. Public Administrator49 and Montana v. United States"0 re-
fering to the "opportunity to litigate."" He asserts these refer-
ences support the view that a party who has an opportunity to
litigate an issue, but does not do so, is nevertheless bound as to
the issue.52 However, Schwartz and Montana and many other deci-
sions invoked by Professor Vestal involve a party who in fact
actually litigated the issue in the prior action. The reference to
"opportunity" in these decisions is to test whether, as to an issue
the party did litigate, the opportunity was sufficient that he
should not be allowed to litigate the issue again. To cite such lan-
guage for the proposition that opportunity alone carries preclu-
sive effects is to distort the syntax of these decisions.
4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977)
[§ 27].
41 See Vestal, supra note 40, at 472.
41 See A. VESTAL, REs JUDICATA/PREcLUSION 199-203 (1969).
49 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69, 246 N.E.2d 725, 728, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1969).
- 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
" See Vestal, supra note 40, at 468-70.
52 See id.
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There are, to be sure, cases saying that the principle of issue
preclusion applies to propositions put in issue as well as proposi-
tions actually litigated. In many of the cases cited by Professor
Vestal for this thesis, however, the statement is plainly obiter dictum
because the issue in question actually had been litigated in the
prior action. This is true, for example, of Scott Paper Co. v. Fort
Howard Paper Co." and Oldham v. Prichett14 Furthermore, many
of the default judgment cases cited by Professor Vestal involved a
judgment loser trying to abrogate the judgment through new
litigation attacking a proposition upon which prior judgment de-
pended. They do not involve a judgment winner trying to extend
the effect of the prior judgment by using it to preclude litigation
of an issue in a subsequent action involving a different claim.
These cases involve attempts to avoid the claim preclusive effect of
a prior default judgment, not attempts to attach issue preclusive
effect to such a judgment. To say a default judgment loser may
not overcome the judgment, because he had opportunity to liti-
gate the issues therein, is not to say that he is also bound as to
these issues in another action involving a different cause of
action. 6 It is not unfair to say that inattention to niceties such as
these in the handling of authority diminished Professor Vestal's
persuasiveness with the Institute.
Professor Vestal would have to concede that there are situa-
tions where a party plainly has had opportunity to litigate, did not
do so, and is not held to an estoppel. The clearest situation is
where a defendant in a criminal case enters a plea of nolo conten-
dere and an issue involved in the criminal charge therafter arises
in a civil action. I am not entirely sure of Professor Vestal's posi-
tion on this problem, but I gather he would say that a nolo conten-
dere plea should not give rise to issue preclusion. But on his
premise that opportunity to litigate is the equivalent of an admis-
sion, why not? The explanation presumably is that imposing col-
lateral preclusive consequences would undesirably create extrinsic
incentives to litigate in a criminal proceeding. But if this explana-
tion applies to a criminal nolo plea, why doesn't it apply to failure
11 343 F. Supp. 225, 228 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
599 F.2d 274, 281 (8th Cir. 1979).
51 See, e.g., Harvey v. Griffiths, 133 Cal. App. 17, 21-22, 23 P.2d 532, 534 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1933) (refusal to set aside default judgment on grounds of intrinsic fraud).
5 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1, Illustrations 9, 10 [§ 22], with
id. § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 27].
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to dispute allegations in a civil proceeding? Because symmetry of
outcomes is more important in civil cases than criminal? Because
the incentives to litigate are less (or more) in civil cases? One
draws a blank.
Analysis of the nolo contendere plea in a criminal case thus in-
dicates that mere opportunity to litigate an issue on one occasion
is not a sufficient reason for estopping a person from litigating
that issue on some subsequent occasion. Otherwise, the plea of
nolo contendere would be the equivalent of an express admission-
a guilty plea. Moreover, when an issue has been posed in a pro-
ceeding, the rendition of a judgment in the proceeding is not
necessary in order to estop a party from disputing the issue in
subsequent litigation. Imagine this situation: a defendant is
charged with arson of his warehouse; he pleads guilty; he dies
before judgment is entered; his estate then sues the insurer of the
warehouse to recover the fire insurance. Surely the estate should
be estopped to deny that the decedent burned down the ware-
house. Given the plea of guilty-a solemn admission of the mat-
ter in question-the ensuing judgment is superfluous so far as
estoppel is concerned. A judgment, as such, is not necessary to
give rise to an estoppel if the party's admission or failure to deny
is so plainly deliberate and unequivocal as to suggest that the sub-
sequent disputation is simply frivolous. The same analysis holds in
civil controversies. Hence, a judgment is neither sufficient nor
necessary to generate an estoppel with regard to a matter that was
in issue but not actually litigated.
A good case can be made for saying that if a matter is dis-
tinctly put in issue and formally admitted, the party making the
admission should be bound by it in subsequent litigation. This was
the old formulation of the rule of 'Judicial estoppel," as it was
then called: "The former verdict is conclusive only as to facts
directly and distinctly put in issue .... ," But how can a matter
be "directly and distinctly put in issue"? Obviously, by actual
litigation. Another way is through pleadings. In a pleading system
where matters are "distinctly put in issue," it makes sense to say
that if a proposition is clearly asserted, and if a party is called
upon solemnly to admit or deny the proposition, and if the stakes
are high enough to assure that the party is serious in dealing with
the issue, and if the party then admits or fails to deny the propo-
sition, then he ought to be estopped from controverting it on
5' A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 257, at 273 (2d ed. 1874).
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some other occasion, particularly if that other occasion involves
essentially the same transaction. The clearest case for such an
estoppel is where a defendant pleads guilty to a substantial crim-
inal charge and then seeks in civil litigation concerning the same
transaction to assert that he did not commit the criminal act.
Particularly galling is the situation where a criminal convicted on
his own guilty plea seeks as plaintiff in a subsequent civil action to
claim redress based on a repudiation of the confession. The
effrontery or, as some might say it, chutzpah, is too much to take.
There certainly should be an estoppel in such a case.58
The same principle could apply when an issue is put forward
and admitted "distinctly"-that is, clearly and solemnly-in a civil
case. It is therefore appropriate to impose an estoppel based on a
formal admission in a civil case, and the law of evidence does so.
A judicial admission is considered in subsequent litigations as
prima facie evidence that the admitted matter is true. 9
The relation between judicial admissions and subsequent
estoppel merits closer examination. In a procedural system that
aims to put things "distinctly in issue" in the pre-trial stage, judi-
cial admissions are elicited as a matter of course. This was the
effect of the system of common law pleading, the Hillary Rules,
and the classical form of code pleading. Admissions were an im-
portant by-product of a system of pleading designed to put things
"distinctly in issue" as a preface to conducting a trial. The process
of obtaining admissions in this way was so familiar that they were
called "judicial admissions," treated as part of the law of judg-
ments, and mentioned in books dealing with judgments. In a pro-
cedural system that focuses on pre-trial formulation of issues, it is
appropriate to give estoppel effect to judicial admissions. If a
party is confronted by a distinct allegation, is required by the pro-
cedural rules to admit or deny such assertions, has adequate in-
centive to litigate, and does not deny it, he should be estopped
from later controverting the allegation. That apparently was the
rule under the regime of code pleading.60
But today we work under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and analogous systems. The federal rules reject issue for-
mulation as the basis of adjudicative procedure. Pleadings under
H See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 133, Reporter's Note at 69 (Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1980) [§ 85].
"9 See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 265, at 235-36 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972).
H See A. FREEMAN, supra note 57, at 274.
[Vol. 66:564
HeinOnline -- 66 Cornell L. Rev. 578 1980-81
1981] REVISITING THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
the federal rules merely give notice in broad terms that some sort
of legal controversy is afoot.' The federal rules' mechanism for
identifying issues is not pleading, but interrogation and proof
through discovery and summary judgment or trial. The technique
for specifying the issues is direct immersion in evidence-actual
litigation-and not issue formulation. Professor Vestal, for all his
aspiration to modernity, is thus writing for the wrong century.
What he sees as an imminent form of preclusion in modern pro-
cedure is a fading vestige of code pleading.
This is another instance where change in procedural rules re-
quires modification of res judicata doctrine." Under modern
civil procedure, a party is not required to put matters "distinctly
in issue" before proof is formally marshalled and weighed.
Moreover, in modem civil procedure a party has practically unlim-
ited freedom, or "opportunity," to assert claims and issues. Even
in a simple civil action, a plaintiff can open up any legal con-
troversy between the parties within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the court 6 1 -law or equity, tort or contract, common law or
statute, state or federal. In a strict sense, a plaintiff has an
"opportunity" to raise every issue that could possibly be tendered
in any claim the pleading and jurisdiction rules allow him to raise,
regardless of the logical or evidentiary connections among them.
A defendant has comparable latitude. A defendant has "oppor-
tunity" to raise every issue that would be involved in any defense,
avoidance, or counterclaim that the procedural rules allow him to
assert. Modern pleading allows a defendant to assert as a defense
anything relevant to plaintiff's claim, and to assert as a counter-
claim everything he may have against plaintiff, regardless of rel-
evancy to plaintiff's claim.
This is the measure of "opportunity to litigate" under mod-
ern civil procedure. Does issue preclusion sweep this broad, so
that "opportunity to litigate" an issue becomes the equivalent of
necessity to litigate? No, of course it does not. Then how can
boundaries be constructed on the scope of issue preclusion?
The Restatement Second specifies two different modes of issue
preclusion. The first is the rule of issue preclusion or collateral
estoppel: issues actually litigated may not be relitigated except
under unusual circumstances .6  Everyone agrees to this basic
61 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
62 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introduction at 6-15 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980).
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1977)
[§§ 27, 28]; id. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) [§ 29].
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idea, except the declining band who hold to the "mutuality"
rule.65 The second mode of issue preclusion is the rule of claim
preclusion encompassing "merger" and "bar." The merger rule is
that a winning plaintiff may not, with respect to a claim previ-
ously litigated, assert new issues in hope of expanding the size or
scope of his recovery. The critical variable in this formulation is
the term "claim." ' In effect, under the rule of claim preclusion
there is preclusion as to every issue that is within the plaintiff's
original "claim," unless that issue is also within a separate and
distinct claim. In the latter event, plaintiff may litigate the issue in
his second action if he did not actually litigate it in the original
action.
The rule of bar imposes similar preclusion on the defendant.
A losing defendant may not, with respect to a claim previously
litigated, assert new issues in hope of overcoming or reducing the
recovery awArded in the prior judgment. There are two critical
variables in this formulation. One is the "claim" of the plaintiff.
The scope of the plaintiff's "claim" obviously defines the scope of
the defendant's potential defenses; otherwise, any "claim" by a
plaintiff would require a defendant to assert defenses to every
conceivable claim the plaintiff could have. The other critical vari-
able in defining the scope of claim preclusion imposed on a de-
fendant is the boundary between "defense" and "counterclaim."
The boundary here is, or at least should be, complementary to
the definition of plaintiff's "claim." Every issue that would defeat
the "claim" is a "defense" within the rule of bar. 7 Such an issue
therefore may not be subsequently asserted by the defendant un-
65 The "mutuality of estoppel" doctrine prevents a nonparty to a prior action from
invoking issue preclusion against an opponent who previously litigated an issue against
another party and lost. Because the party who previously litigated the issue would not be
allowed to use issue preclusion against an opponent who was not a party to the first action,
there is no "mutuality of estoppel" and neither should be allowed to invoke preclusion. See
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.24 at 577 (2d ed. 1977).
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 24].
'7 Analytically, the boundary between claim-and-defense, on one hand, and counter-
claim, on the other, is clean. Operationally, however, the boundary is quite messy, because
of the protean possibilities of "claim." But the Restatement Second takes account of the ambi-
guities and says that, at the margin, the party should be deemed to have litigated only
those issues he should have litigated in the prior action, considering the course of that
action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1, Illustration 6 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973) [§ 22]. In any case, the compulsory counterclaim rule that prevails in most jurisdic-
tions, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), ordinarily makes this problem moot. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1, Illustration 9 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [§ 22].
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less that issue also is within a separate and distinct counterclaim
"claim." In the latter event, a defendant may litigate the issue in
his second action if he did not actually litigate it in the original
action. This is the point of Comment b to section 56.1 [section 22]
of the Restatement Second, which states:
In the absence of a statute or rule of court otherwise providing,
the defendant's failure to allege certain facts either as a defense
or as a counterclaim does not normally preclude him from re-
lying on those facts in an action subsequently brought by him
against the plaintiff.... The failure to interpose a defense to
the plaintiff's claim precludes the defendant from thereafter
asserting the defense as a basis for attacking the judgment (see
§ 47 [§ 18]). But the defendant's claim against the plaintiff is
not normally merged in the judgment given in that action, and
issue preclusion does not apply to issues not actually litigated
(see § 68 [§ 27]). The defendant, in short, is entitled to his day
in court on his own claim.6 8
On the subject of issue preclusion, I believe Professor Vestal
would reach most of the same outcomes as the Restatement Second
when it gets down to cases. But when it comes to doctrine, he
insists on his formulation, apparently untroubled by its literal
meaning. Formulations make a difference. It may be true that
general propositions do not decide concrete cases in the sense that
major premises are not sufficient to generate outcomes. But a ma-
jor premise sets in motion the train of analysis; if misdirected, it
may foreclose an appropriate outcome. I submit that Professor
Vestal's formulation-that opportunity to litigate an issue ordi-
narily results in preclusion as to the issue-is unsound. As a
general proposition, it would be wrong to convert option to lit-
gate into compulsion to litigate, and serious mischief results from
such an approach. This is well illustrated in Palma v. Powers,6 9 a
decision upon which Professor Vestal places much reliance, where
an intelligent judge adopted Professor Vestal's analysis in deciding
the very problem under consideration.
The facts of the case were as follows: Plaintiffs in the present
action were Fred Palma and Frank and Ralph Mamolella. The
Mamolella brothers were partners in, and Palma was an employee
of, an establishment that the police thought was a bookie joint.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
[§ 22].
' 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
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The police obtained a search warrant and conducted a raid on the
establishment, in the course of which they seized and removed the
telephones. Palma and Frank Mamolella were charged with felony
gambling. In due course the charges were reduced to the misde-
meanor of wagering. Frank Mamolella was convicted and fined
$50. Palma was acquitted. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of the
raid the police called Illinois Telephone Company, described the
warrant, raid, and seizure of the telephones, and asked that tele-
phone service at the establishment be discontinued. The Company
complied, relying on a company regulation filed with the Illinois
Commerce Commission which provided:
The service is furnished subject to the condition that it shall not
be used for the purpose of making or accepting bets.... Upon
complaint to the Commission by any ... subscriber who is
affected by the ... discontinuance of service in accordance with
this rule, such service shall be ... restored if the Commission
shall determine that the service has not been used ... in viola-
tion of this rule.70
The Mamolella brothers demanded restoration of service.
However, they did not press their demand until after the criminal
prosecution had terminated and did not file a complaint before
the Commission. Instead, Palma and the Mamolellas sued the
arresting officer and the telephone company under section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act.7' The essence of the section 1983 claim
was that the police and the telephone company had conspired to
deprive plaintiffs of their rights under the Constitution, because
disconnecting the telephone was an invasion of personal or prop-
erty rights and the raid constituted an illegal search and seizure.
Defendants countered, among other things, that the establishment
had in fact been a bookie joint, so that the termination of service
was justified and the raid was legal. To prove the fact that wager-
ing was conducted at the place, defendants quite appropriately
invoked the prior conviction, which actually and necessarily had
adjudicated that issue. 72 As to the legality of the search, defen-
70 Id. at 931.
7' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
12 The court properly held that Frank Mamolella was bound by the finding in the
criminal adjudication that wagering had occurred at the establishment, 295 F. Supp. at
934. However, it is impossible to see why Palma should have been similarly precluded,
because he had been acquitted in the criminal case. Perhaps the court thought that a
servant is bound by an adjudication against his master, a proposition that ceased to be
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dants argued that this issue could have been raised by a motion to
suppress in the criminal proceeding and hence that plaintiffs were
foreclosed from litigating the issue in a subsequent civil action.
Judge Will accepted the defendant's invocation of issue pre-
clusion, citing Professor Vestal and saying:
[T]here are a number of well-considered cases which adopt the
position that, in certain situations, preclusion can arise even
though the issue was not contested in the first suit .... If any
principle may be gleaned ... it is that preclusion is appropriate
in those situations where there is reason to believe that the fail-
ure to litigate the matter in fact was a recognition of the valid-
ity of the opposing claim.15
On this premise, the court proceeded to hold that:
(1) Frank Mamolella, who was convicted in the state criminal pros-
ecution, was precluded from asserting that the police search was
illegal because he could have raised that issue in the state court by
a motion to suppress; and
(2) Palma, who was acquitted in the state criminal prosecution,
was precluded from asserting the illegality of the search because
he too could have raised that issue in the state court.74
We should dispel any impulse to embrace these results based
on the assumption that Palma and Mamolella were members of
organized crime. This variable can be factored out by supposing,
for example, that an apartment was raided, that the arrest was for
possession of marijuana, and that Palma and Mamolella were just
ordinary citizens. The question then is: should a person having a
tort claim against the police for unlawful behavior in an arrest be
precluded from showing the behavior was unlawful because he
could have advanced that contention as a basis for suppression of
evidence following the arrest? And if there is to be issue preclu-
sion, why so?
tenable when servants were recognized as having legal identities separate from their mas-
ters. The court also applied issue preclusion against Ralph Mamolella. Justification for this
result requires an analysis that is intricate but tenable, although the court did not provide
it. While Ralph was not a party to the criminal prosecution, he was in partnership with
Frank, who was convicted on a finding that the partnership enterprise involved illegal
wagering. Because Frank is bound by that finding in his subsequent civil action and be-
cause the original criminal prosecution involved the partnership enterprise, it would be
proper to hold Ralph precluded as to the issue by virtue of his partnership relationship
with Frank. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG NTs § 109 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977)
[§ 60]; id. § 133(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 85].
7- Palma v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. at 935-36.
71 Id. at 940-42.
583
HeinOnline -- 66 Cornell L. Rev. 583 1980-81
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Professor Vestal says there should be an estoppel because,
where there is an incentive to deny, failure to deny constitutes an
admission." This turns the notion of incentive to litigate on its
head. The "incentive to litigate" formula, as used in most of the
cases and in the Restatement Second, allows a party who did litigate
an issue to relitigate it if the party can show that the original
litigation was a side show rather than a struggle to the finish.76
The Restatement Second allows a party to rebut the inference natu-
rally drawn from the fact that the issue was actually litigated-the
inference that the party had treated the issue with entire serious-
ness in the first litigation. In Professor Vestal's system, however,
"incentive to litigate" allows a court to conjecture that the party
probably had reason to litigate the issue in the first action, and to
conjecture further that the failure to litigate is an admission of a
proposition not litigated. Professor Vestal's "opportunity" theory
allows the court to infer that the issue was important to a party
whose behavior indicates he thought the issue was unimportant,
and, having done that, to convict the party by his silence. Does
that make sense? In Palma v. Powers, after all, Mamolella was only
fined $50. And Palma was acquitted. Why should a forfeiture of
claim result from omitting to make a protest that events have
proved to be superfluous?78
I hope this analysis makes clear why the Restatement Second
did not deal with issue preclusion in the way that Professor Vestal
has urged. It also makes a point about the matter raised by Pro-
fessor Martin. Professor Martin says that, in regard to claim pre-
clusion, we should have distinguished between matters a party
should have litigated and matters that he actually litigated.79
5 See Vestal, supra note 40, at 468-69.
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(e), Comment j (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977) [§ 28].
71 See Vestal, supra note 40, at 468-69.
7'8 If Professor Vestal is correct, the result will, among other things, mean the death of
suits against public officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) if the official gets to the state
courthouse first. I do not know the correct resolution of the problem of § 1983 litigation,
and neither does the American Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 134 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) [§ 86]. However, I am sure that Professor Vestal's result
cannot be right. If opportunity to litigate is the prima facie equivalent of actual litigation, it
means that anyone who upon legal provocation fails to run for the courthouse may be in
jeopardy of having to explain himself or be denied his day in court. Kafka's The Trial
comes to mind.
79 Martin, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: An Overview, 66 CORNELL L. RPv.
404, 407 (1981). Professor Martin argues that the Institute should have replaced the terms
"merger" and "bar" with functional concepts. Instead of the Restatement Second's emphasis
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However, the difficult problems in the law of res judicata do not
involve the distinction between "should have" and "actually" lit-
gated, but rather the connection between these concepts. The
problem is that of working out the relationship between what was
actually done in a litigation, what might have been done, and
what a court will deem to have been done. This problem is very
clear in the matter of claim preclusion. The law says that the
litigation of a claim normally carries with it the opportunity to
argue everything that could be urged for and against the claim.
Therefore, a lawsuit ordinarily will be deemed to have considered
all such things in relation to that claim. The critical variable is
thus the scope of the term "claim."
The same problem presents itself in the matter of issue pre-
clusion, although the relationship between "should have" and
"actually" is not quite so obvious. The basic idea is that a party
should not be able to relitigate an issue that he actually litigated.
The critical variable is the scope of the term "issue." "Issue" might
mean only a proposition necessarily implied from evidence actu-
ally offered. If this were the meaning assigned to "issue actually
litigated," the scope of issue preclusion in subsequent litigation
relating to the same general subject matter would be very
narrow."0 It is clear that "issue" means something more than this.
As stated in Comment c to section 68 [section 27] of the Restate-
ment Second:
When there is a lack of total identity between the particular
matter presented in the second action and that presented in the
first, there are several factors that should be considered in de-
ciding whether for purposes of the rule of [issue preclusion]
the "issue" in the two proceedings is the same, for example: Is
on claims merged in a plaintiff's victory and defenses barred by a defendant's loss, Profes-
sor Martin would equate merger with efficiency and bar with consistency: "merger occurs
when a party should have presented a matter at the first trial, and bar occurs when allow-
ing a party to relitigate a matter might produce a result inconsistent with the out-
come of the earlier litigation." Id. at 407. Thus, his efficiency concept deals with what
should have been done in the prior action, and the consistency concept preserves results
regarding matters actually litigated.
" Indeed, logically no single proposition is necessarily implied from an item of evi-
dence or chain of evidence. An item or chain of evidence could be a link to a nearly
infinite array of propositions. Therefore, when we say that an issue has been "actually
litigated," we do so by drawing an inference not from the evidence alone but from the
conclusion we suppose that the tribunal was asked to draw from the evidence. However,
the conclusions that a tribunal properly may draw depend on what is in issue. Thus, ex-
amination of the evidence alone takes us on a circle. In the absence of pleadings, a pretrial
order, or other specifications, the circle can be broken only by looking at the proceeding as
a whole, particularly the parties' opening and closing arguments.
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there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument
... ? Does the new [action] involve application of the same rule
of law... ? Could pretrial preparation and discovery relating to
... the first action reasonably be expected to have embraced
the matter sought to be presented in the second? 8
Thus, the law of preclusion, whether issue preclusion or
claim preclusion, combines an assessment of what was actually
done with an assessment of what reasonably should have been
done. For this reason, I believe Professor Martin offers incorrect
reasons for dropping the terms "merger" and "bar."82 However,
I agree that the terms should have been dropped. They serve
merely as vehicles for inquiring how far a winner or loser should
be bound, and do not do much to carry that inquiry forward.
IV
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Professor Moore's thesis, as I understand it, is that the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction should be deemed resolved by a
judgment, under the principle of res judicata, except in certain
limited circumstances." I agree with that proposition and so does
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. What, then, is its difference
with Professor Moore?
One difference is in strategy and rhetoric in reforming the
law. In substance all law reform is both radical and conservative.
It is radical because it seeks purposively to change social institu-
tions. It is conservative in that it uses the means of law and legal
process to do so. In style and strategy, law reform enterprises can
be conservative or radical. A conservative strategy seeks to accom-
plish as much in the way of needed change as the forces favoring
the status quo will permit, while providing as much assurance
about continuity as plausibility requires. A radical reform strategy
seeks to advance the strongest case for change that plausibly can
be maintained, while settling for as much actual change as the
forces favoring the status quo will permit. A conservative strategy
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
[§ 27].
12 See Martin, supra note 79, at 407.
" See Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 534, 535 (1981).
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understates objectives, sometimes underachieves compared to
what objectively is possible, and leaves the radicals muttering
about sellout and lost opportunity. A radical strategy overstates
objectives, sometimes overachieves compared to what objectively is
possible, and leaves the conservatives muttering about shortfall
and needless turmoil.
A Restatement should be strongly reformist,' for otherwise it is
difficult to see why such an endeavor would be worth the trouble.
With regard to reform in the law of judgments concerning the
problem of subject matter jurisdiction, the aim should be, as Pro-
fessor Moore says, a rule that the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is ordinarily deemed resolved by a judgment. The questions,
then, are whether this substantive objective was realized in the
Restatement Second, particularly with regard to the scope of the ex-
ceptions subsumed under the term "ordinarily," and whether
appropriate rhetoric was employed in doing so.
One way to formulate the basic rule that subject matter juris-
diction questions ordinarily are precluded is to say, "Subject mat-
ter jurisdiction questions are precluded by a judgment, except as
follows..." and then construct the array of exceptions. Another
is to say, "Subject matter jurisdiction questions remain open de-
spite a judgment in the following circumstances..." and then con-
struct the array of circumstances. Logically and positively the two
approaches are equivalent, their content depending on the excep-
tions or qualifying circumstances, as the case may be. However,
the first approach entails a sharp rhetorical departure from older
law, while the second does not.
In the Restatement Second we took the second approach. To
implement it, we adopted two distinctions that I think are critical,
but one of which Professor Moore seems to think is unim-
portant. 5  One is between default judgments and judgments
in contested actions." The other is between that component of
jurisdiction having to do with territorial jurisdiction among poli-
tical sovereignties and that component having to do with the
allocation of authority to the rendering court by the political
" See Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work
of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis L. REv. 185, 189 (1968).
See Moore, supra note 83, at 561. Professor Moore's article deals only with "subject
matter jurisdiction" and does not discuss "territorial jurisdiction."
8 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to ch. 2 at 2-4 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978). Compare id. §§ 113-116 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 65-68], with id. §§
117-120 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§§ 69-72]. See also Moore, supra note 83, at 561.
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sovereignty that created it. The first component we called
"territorial jurisdiction," the second we called "subject matter
jurisdiction."87  Using these two distinctions, four different situa-
tions are involved:





Situation A is where a party appears at the proceeding, either
to assert only that the court lacks territorial jurisdiction, or to de-
fend on other grounds as well. In this situation, under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments, the judgment is always preclusive.M The
law is quite clear on this point and Professor Moore does not dis-
agree.
Situation B is where a party does not appear at the proceed-
ing even though the issue of territorial jurisdiction is arguable.
When this happens, default judgment may be entered. If nothing
happens thereafter, the question of jurisdiction is moot; plaintiff
has a judgment but defendant is not practically affected by it.
However, if plaintiff seeks to enforce the judgment in the forum
state or in another state, defendant may seek to resist the enforce-
ment on the ground that the judgment was "void." This resistance
may take the form of a motion in the original action to reopen
the judgment, or a motion to quash the enforcement pro-
ceeding. 9 In either case, relief may be denied if the applicant
unduly delayed in seeking relief," if other equitable considera-
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note to ch. 1 at 8-13 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978).
" See id. § 13 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) [§ 10]. This rule is subject to exceptions re-
garding fraud, duress, or the like. See id. § 118-120 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§§ 70-72].
TM The prevailing view, adopted in the Restatement Second, is that ordinarily the
appropriate mode of relief for a local judgment is by motion in the original action. See id.
§ 126 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 78].
0 See id. § 126, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 78]; id. § 127, Comment c
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 79].
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tions warrant denial of relief,91 or if substantial interests of re-
liance would be impaired by granting relief." On the other
hand, if relief is timely sought and no interests of reliance have
intervened, the defaulting party may be granted relief.
When a court grants relief in the instance last mentioned, in
effect it allows the defaulting defendant an extension of time-
from the date of the judgment to the date of the enforcement
action-in which to object to territorial jurisdiction. The cases
plainly hold that such an extension should be granted unless
there are intervening equities.
The judges know that most of these default cases result from
ignorance on the part of the defaulting party, or blundering or
dilatoriness on the part of counsel. If the question of territorial
jurisdiction is reasonably arguable, an adequately represented
party will never allow judgment to be entered by default." On
the other hand, if the question of territorial jurisdiction is open
and shut in favor of the defaulting party, why shouldn't the judg-
ment be regarded as void?
Consider a case to test the latter: Defendant lives in Alaska,
and has done so all her life. She is involved in an automobile
accident in Alaska with a car driven by a citizen of Florida. The
Florida citizen returns home and commences an action for his in-
juries in a Florida court. Is the Alaska resident required to appear
in Florida to object to jurisdiction, or can she wait until the per-
son from Florida tries to enforce the judgment in Alaska? If the
answer is that the Alaskan must appear in Florida, then a defen-
dant must appear in an unreasonable forum to argue that the
forum is unreasonable. This would undercut the purpose of hav-
ing territorial limits on state court jurisdiction in the first place. In
any event, under the law as it now stands, and as it has stood for
9' See id. § 122 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 74].
9 See id. § 114 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 66].
'" Given the choice between defaulting and making a special appearance to contest
territorial jurisdiction, would any sane lawyer choose the former if the jurisdictional ques-
tion was reasonably arguable? If the party defaults and tries to resist enforcement of the
judgment by contesting territorial jurisdiction, he foregoes opportunity to contest the
merits. There are some situations, particularly in international litigation, where it may be
prudent to employ the strategy of suffering a default and then resisting enforcement of
the judgment. This strategy may make sense when the defendant believes the original
forum will be hostile in its approach to the merits or to the jurisdictional question. A
defendant might also default when the judgment will have to be enforced in a jurisdiction
that defendant believes will have a sympathetic attitude toward his position on the jurisdic-
tional question. Relative cost of litigation in the two forums may also be a consideration.
See, e.g., Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).
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two hundred years, a defendant is not required to appear in
order to avail himself of the jurisdictional defense. He can de-
fault, await the day when enforcement of the judgment is at-
tempted, and then make a "collateral attack." Hence, in situation
B the question of territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily fore-
closed by the judgment, nor can I think of a reason why it should
be.
We now come to situation C. Here, the action has been con-
tested and the issue is subject matter jurisdiction, in the sense of
allocation of authority among various tribunals in a state. As Pro-
fessor Moore observes, it is now fairly well established that if the
question of subject matter jurisdiction is actually litigated, the
question is foreclosed in all circumstances except those falling into
standard exceptions to the rules of preclusion.9 4 The cases that
have caused difficulty are those in which the proceeding was con-
tested but the matter of jurisdiction was not raised, i.e., the parties
assumed the court had authority to adjudicate the matter. The
Restatement Second says that the judgment in this situation is
beyond attack unless there are no justifiable interests of reliance
that must be protected," and:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond
the court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a
manifest abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially in-
fringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of gov-
ernment; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capabil-
ity to make an adequately informed determination of a ques-
tion concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of proce-
dural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should
have opportunity belatedly to attack the court's subject matter
jurisdiction.96
As I read Professor Moore's formulation, it is in substance identi-
cal to this as applied to an action that was contested on the
merits. 7
94 See Moore, supra note 83, at 548; see, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 12].
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 117 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 69].
Id. § 15 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979) [§ 12].
Professor Moore's formulation precludes collateral attack on subject matter jurisdic-
tion where an appearance was made but the issue of jurisdiction was not raised, unless
strong extrinsic factors implicating jurisdiction, such as substantial interference with the
effective exercise of powers which have been lodged exclusively in another tribunal or
agency, are present." Moore, supra note 83, at 561.
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This brings us, finally, to Situation D, where the judgment
was by default and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Under the Restatement Second formulation, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction means lack of authority to decide the "type of con-
troversy involved in the action." 98 Operationally, this is equivalent
to sections 15(1) and 15(2) of the Restatement Second, quoted above.
There are not many cases where the judgment was by default and
subject matter jurisdiction was clearly lacking.9 The proverbial
case involves a justice of the peace who has undertaken to grant a
divorce. Professor Moore would require the respondent in such a
case to appear before the justice under penalty that otherwise the
divorce would be legally valid. I cannot believe any court would
hold that.
V
NEXT ON THE AGENDA
The task for lawyers interested in the law of judgments is
now to make the best use possible of the new Restatement Second.
Part of that task is to integrate it with other areas of the law,
procedural and substantive. Professor Casad has made a nice be-
ginning with his article dealing with the problem of the issue and
claim preclusive effects of a judgment outside the state of
rendition.'"
CONCLUSION
One of the main purposes of the Restatement process is to
generate critical thought in important areas of the law. Much of
this thought was actually brought to bear in the Institute during
the drafting process, and contributed greatly to the quality of the
finished product. However, the process does not stop when a final
draft is approved by the Institute. On the contrary, it is hoped
that approval of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments will encour-
age further scholarly and professional discourse on the law of
judgments.
I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (Tent. Draft. No. 5, 1978) [§ 11].
See id., Reporter's Note to § 15 at 163 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1979) [§ 12].
100 See Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 510 (1981).
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This Symposium is a welcome beginning to that discourse. It
will be an important part of the materials at hand when a new
Advisory Committee convenes to begin drafting the Restatement
(Third) of Judgments.
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